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A cryptographic hash function is a hash function with certain additional security 
properties to make it suitable for use as a primitive in various information security
applications, such as authentication and message integrity. A hash function takes a 
long string (or message) of any length as input and produces a fixed length string as 
output, sometimes termed a message digest or a digital fingerprint. In various 
standards and applications, the two most-commonly used hash functions are MD5 and 
SHA-1 ; however, as of 2005, security flaws have been identified in both algorithms.
Definition 1.1 (Cryptographic Hash Function) A cryptographic hash function is a 
mapping
h : {0,1}*→{0,1}n
where {0,1}* denotes the set of bit strings of arbitrary length. The image h(X) of 
some message X Є {0,1}* is called the hash value of X.
Broadly speaking, a cryptographic hash function should behave as much as 
possible like a random function while still being deterministic and efficiently 
computable. There is no formal definition which captures all of the properties 
considered desirable for a cryptographic hash function. The properties below are 
generally considered prerequisites and a violation of any of these properties implies a 
weak hash function:
Preimage resistant: given h it should be computationally infeasible to find any m
such that h = hash(m).
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Second preimage resistant: given an input m1, it should be computationally infeasible 
to find another input, m2 (not equal to m1) such that hash(m1) = hash(m2).
Collision-resistant: it should be computationally infeasible to find two different 
messages m1 and m2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2).
It should be noted that the meaning of “computationally infeasible” is very 
much a subjective phrase. One can define a problem to be “computationally 
infeasible” if solving it would require more than a pre-specified upper bound in space 
or computing speed. However, considering the current rate with which computing 
machines are being improved, what might be deemed “computationally infeasible” 
today might be perfectly feasible tomorrow.
1.1 Applications of Hash Functions
A particularly important application of hash functions occurs in the context of digital 
signature schemes. Digital signature is a type of method for authenticating digital
information analogous to ordinary physical signatures on paper, but implemented 
using techniques from the field of public- key cryptography. 
Digital signature schemes rely on public-key cryptography. In public-key 
cryptography, each user has a pair of keys: one public and one private. The public key 
is distributed freely, but the private key is kept secret and confidential; another 
requirement is that it should be infeasible to derive the private key from the public 
key. A general digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
• A key generation algorithm
• A signing algorithm
• A verification algorithm
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For example, consider the situation in which Bob sends a message to Alice and wants 
to be able to prove it came from him. Bob sends his message to Alice and attaches a 
digital signature. The digital signature is generated using Bob's private key, and takes 
the form of a simple numerical value (normally represented as a string of binary 
digits). On receipt, Alice can then check whether the message really came from Bob 
by running the verification algorithm on the message together with the signature and
Bob's public key. If the verification algorithm accepts the message, then Alice can be 
confident that the message really was from Bob, because the signing algorithm is 
designed so that it is very difficult to forge a signature to match a given message 
(unless one has knowledge of the private key, which Bob has kept secret).
The problem with such a scheme is that the signature is usually about as big as 
the message itself. Thus, for efficiency reasons, Bob first applies a cryptographic hash 
function to the message before signing. This makes the signature much shorter and 
thus saves time since hashing is generally much faster than signing in 
implementations. However, if the message digest algorithm is insecure (for example, 
if it is possible to generate hash collisions), then it might be feasible to forge digital 
signatures.
To elaborate, suppose Alice and Eve agree to sign a document detailing some 
financial transactions between them. Also, suppose that Eve is dishonest and is able 
to produce two documents which are mapped to the same hash value and whose 
contents differ significantly. That is, suppose  Eve was able to find another document 
with another set of conditions benefiting Eve that has the same hash value as the 
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original financial document. Now, Alice might be in agreement with the conditions of 
the original document. So Eve asks Alice for her digital signature on the original 
document and what Eve receives is not only a valid signature for the original 
document but also for the forged document as well. The signature is valid for both 
messages because the verification process only refers to their common hash value. 
Eve can now replace one message by the other and claim that Alice signed the second 
message, the document that unfairly benefits her. Hence, it is important to require 
hash functions to be collision resistant.
1.2 The Merkle-Damgård Construction for Hash Functions
The Merkle-Damgård method or MD-design principle is a generic method of 
constructing a cryptographic hash function. A cryptographic hash function must be 
able to process an arbitrary-length message into a fixed-length output. This can be 
achieved by breaking the input up into a series of equal-sized blocks, and operating 
on them in sequence using a compression function that processes a fixed-length input 
into a shorter, fixed-length output, each time combining a block of the input with the 
output of the previous round.
Definition 1.2.1 (Compression Function) A compression function is a mapping
 g : {0,1}m x {0,1}l→{0,1}m
with 1 ≤ m < l which can be evaluated efficiently. Here the {0,1}m part of the domain 
is some fixed parameter IV (initial value) and the compression function g is denoted 
by gIV (and maps {0,1}l→{0,1}m).
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Typically an input message is padded such that the length of the padded input 
message is a multiple of l. An algorithm for the Merkle-Damgård construction 
proceeds as follows:
Given: Compression function g : {0,1}m x {0,1}l→{0,1}m;
l-bit constant IV;
Input : Message M;
1. Break M into m-bit blocks M0,…, Mk-1, padding if necessary;
2. Let h0 = IV;
3. For i = 1 to k let h i = 1 1( , );i ig h M− −
4. Output hk;
Since compression functions can be seen as small hash functions in themselves, it 
seems natural that the collision resistance of a compression function implies the 
collision resistance of the hash function. We make this more precise with the 
following definitions and theorem:
Definition 1.2.2 (Collision of the Compression Function) A collision of the 
compression function g consists of an initial value IV and different inputs X and 'X
such that
gIV(X) = gIV '( )X
Theorem 1.2.4 ([5]) Let g be a collision resistant compression function and h be a 
hash function, constructed from g by using the MD-design principle. Then h is 
collision resistant.
6
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
It seems intuitively clear that the property of collision resistance is the most important 
for hash functions and not surprisingly it is the target of most attacks on hash 
functions. The attack on the MD5 hash function by Xiaoyun Wang proved that MD5 
is not collision resistant. In this thesis, we will attempt to explain Wang’s attack on 
MD5. In order to understand the attack on MD5 we will need some background 
knowledge. In chapter 2 we explain the MD5 algorithm and some of its important 
characteristics. In chapter 3 we provide a toolbox for the cryptanalysis of MD5. 
Firstly, theorems pertaining to additions of integers modulo 2n , bit rotations, and 
bitwise Boolean functions are presented. These theorems are taken from Magnus 
Daum’s PhD thesis [2]. Most of the theorems will be stated without proof (for proofs 
see [2]). Secondly, we analyze difference propagation in hash functions. It seems 
intuitive that in order to understand the attack on the collision resistance of hash 
functions we would need to study the effect of input differences on the output 
differences. Particularly, we are interested in studying the conditions under which 
non-zero input differences produce a zero output difference. Finally, in chapter 4 we 
attempt to explain Wang’s attack on MD5 using the background knowledge from the 
previous chapters.
7
Chapter 2: The MD5 Algorithm
The MD5 hash function belongs to a class of hash functions called the MD4-Family. 
The hash functions of this class use the iteration scheme as dictated by the Merkle-
Damgård construction. In Crypto ’89, Merkle and Damgård submitted a seminal 
article on the construction of hash functions using the iteration scheme. Inspired by 
this article, Rivest proposed the MD4 hash function, a predecessor of MD5, one year 
later. After cryptanalysis of MD4 revealed certain unexpected properties that raised 
concerns about its security, Rivest proposed the MD5 hash function in 1992. It 
incorporated many of the ideas used to design MD4 but with more emphasis on 
security rather than efficiency. Thus, Wang’s attack on MD5 is applicable to MD4 as 
well. In fact, Wang’s method produces collisions in MD4 much more quickly than in 
MD5. 
MD5 processes a variable length message into a fixed-length output of 128 
bits. The input message is broken up into chunks of 512-bit blocks. The message is 
padded so that its length in bits is divisible by 512. The padding works as follows: 
first a single bit, 1, is appended to the end of the message. This is followed by as 
many zeros as are required to bring the length of the message up to 64 bits less than a 
multiple of 512. The remaining bits are filled up with a 64-bit integer representing the 
length of the original message. Obviously, restricting the length of the message to 64 
bits precludes the possibility of processing “arbitrarily long” messages but in practice 
a message length greater than 642 1− is highly unlikely. Hence, for all practical 
purposes, we can consider the hash function as being able to process messages of 
arbitrary length. Details about the padding of an input message do not play any role in 
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our explanation of Wang’s attack. Thus we will assume that the input message length 
is a multiple of 512. 
The main MD5 algorithm operates on a 128-bit state, divided into four 32-bit 
words (or registers), denoted a, b, c and d. As usual, 32-bit words are integers mod 
232. These are initialized to certain fixed constants collectively called IV (or initial 
value). The main algorithm then operates on each 512-bit message block in turn, each 
block modifying the state. The processing of a message block consists of four similar 
stages, termed rounds; each round is composed of 16 similar operations (or step 
operations) based on a non-linear function fi, modular addition, and left rotation. Here 
0 ≤ i <64 denotes the ith step operation. 
Recall that MD5 is only one hash function in the class of hash functions called 
MD4-Family. The non linear boolean functions used for the MD4-Family are:
XOR(X, Y, Z) = X Y Z⊕ ⊕
MAJ(X, Y, Z) =  ( ) ( ) ( )X Y X Z Y Z∧ ⊕ ∧ ⊕ ∧
ITE(X, Y, Z) = ( ) ( )X Y X Z∧ ⊕ ∧
ONX(X, Y, Z) = ( )X Y Z∨ ⊕
Sometimes the functions ITE and ONX are applied with swapped parameters. Thus, 
for example, we will denote ITE(Z, X, Y) by ITEzxy.
Since MD5 is a member of the MD4-Family, a subset of the functions from 
the above list is used. A different boolean function, fi is used in each round of MD5. 
Note that MAJ is not used for MD5:
fi(X, Y, Z) = ITE = (X ∧  Y) ∨  (¬X ∧  Z), 0 ≤ i ≤ 15
fi(X, Y, Z) = ITEzxy = (X ∧  Z) ∨  (Y ∧  ¬Z), 16 ≤ i ≤ 31
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fi(X, Y, Z) = XOR = X ⊕  Y ⊕  Z, 32≤ i ≤ 47
fi(X, Y, Z) = ONXxzy = Y ⊕  (X ∨  ¬Z),             48 ≤ i ≤ 63
⊕ ,∧ ,∨ , ¬ denote the XOR, AND, OR and NOT operations.
Let ti and si denote step dependent constants, the + operator denote addition 
modulo 232 and « denote the rotational left shift operator. If M is a 512 bit message 
block, then M = <m0, m1,…, m15> where mk is a 32 bit word. In each round of sixteen
step operations, these sixteen 32 bit words are used exactly once and wi denotes the
round dependent permutations of these sixteen 32 bit words that make up the message 
block. The round dependent permutation is given as follows:
Let k Є {0,1,2,3} indicate the rounds. Then
w16k +i = mi mod 16 , if k = 0
w16k +i = m5i + 1  mod 16 , if k = 1
w16k +i = m3i + 5  mod 16 , if k = 2
w16k +i = m7i  mod 16 , if k = 3
Let [abcd i] denote the following operation:
( ( , , ) )i i ia b a f b c d w t= + + + +
« is
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/*Do the following 16 operations for round 0*/
[abcd 0]    [dabc 1]  [cdab 2]    [bcda 3]
[abcd 4]    [dabc 5]  [cdab 6]    [bcda 7]
[abcd 8]    [dabc 9]  [cdab 10]  [bcda 11]
[abcd 12]  [dabc 13]  [cdab 14]  [bcda 15]
/*Do the following 16 operations for round 1*/
[abcd 16]  [dabc 17]  [cdab 18]  [bcda 19]
[abcd 20]  [dabc 21]  [cdab 22]  [bcda 23]
[abcd 24]  [dabc 25]  [cdab 26]  [bcda 27]
[abcd 28]  [dabc 29]  [cdab 30]  [bcda 31]
/*Do the following 16 operations for round 2*/
[abcd 32]  [dabc 33]  [cdab 34]  [bcda 35]
[abcd 36]  [dabc 37]  [cdab 38]  [bcda 39]
[abcd 40]  [dabc 41]  [cdab 42]  [bcda 43]
[abcd 44]  [dabc 45]  [cdab 46]  [bcda 47]
/*Do the following 16 operations for round 3*/
[abcd 48]  [dabc 49]  [cdab 50]  [bcda 51]
[abcd 52]  [dabc 53]  [cdab 54]  [bcda 55]
[abcd 56]  [dabc 57]  [cdab 58]  [bcda 59]
[abcd 60]  [dabc 61]  [cdab 62]  [bcda 63]
a = a + aa
b = b + bb
c = c + cc
d = d + dd
end
return (a, b, c, d)
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An important part of the step operations in MD5 are the non linear Boolean 
functions, which are applied bitwise to the registers. These functions have been 
chosen because:
• They support a strong avalanche effect, which means that small differences in 
the registers are mapped to large differences in only a few step operations.
• The functions are balanced, which means that | 1(0)f − | = | 1(1)f − |. 
• The correlation between a boolean function and an arbitrary linear mapping 
{0,1}3 → {0,1} is quite small so the boolean function is non linear.
• The Boolean functions produce their output from the bits of X, Y, and Z, in 
such a manner that if the input bits of X, Y, and Z are independent and 
unbiased, then the output bit of the corresponding function will be 
independent and unbiased.
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Chapter 3: A Toolbox for Cryptanalysis of MD5
In this chapter we provide the background theory necessary for the cryptanalysis of 
MD5. In fact, much of the theory presented here is an indispensable tool for 
understanding other hash functions and block ciphers. After introducing some 
notation, we will present some theorems on the relationship between modular 
differences (mod 232) and xor differences in section 3.1. In 3.2 we will then focus our 
attention on the relationship between bit rotations and modular addition (mod 232) and 
explicitly analyze what happens when we interchange the application of the two 
operations. To conclude the background theory, we will investigate difference 
propagation in section 3.3.
3.1 Modular Differences and XOR Differences
Modular addition and xor addition are two of the most important operations used in 
the design of hash functions. To denote the difference between two 32 bit registers x
and 'x we have to consider:
XOR difference: x⊕∆ = 'x x⊕ and Modular difference: x+∆ = 'x x− mod 322
We state that all bit positions are indexed from 0. Since a 32 bit number will include 
many zeroes in its bit representation, and to avoid writing out such lengthy 
representations, we use the following notation:
1[ ,..., ]ri i = (xn-1,…,x0) where 1 ... 1,ri ix x= = = and
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xj = 0 for all 1{ ,..., }.rj i i∉
This means:
1 2
1 0( ,..., ) 2 2 ... 2 r
i i i
nx x x−= = + + +
On occasion, we will not only need to know the modular difference of two 
bits but also their exact values. To that end we introduce the concept of signed bitwise 
differences denoted by:
x±∆ = ' '1 1 0 0( ,..., )n nx x x x− −− −
'( ) { 1,0,1}ni iwhere x x− ∈ −
To abbreviate values from { 1− ,0,1}n, we introduce the notation ki  to denote 
ki
x  = 1− . For example,
[i1 , 2i , 3i ,i4] = x
±∆ where 
1 4
1i ix x= = , 2 3 0i ix x= = , 1 4
' ' 0i ix x= = , 
2 3
' ' 1i ix x= =  and
'
j jx x−  = 0 for all j ∉{i1,…,i4}.
It should be noted that the signed bitwise difference ( )±∆  has no direct relation to the 
modular difference ( )+∆ .
Another piece of notation that will prove to be useful later pertains to how we 
can express step operations concisely and clearly. In most descriptions of MD5, the 
registers are labeled a, b, c, d and the step operations are defined as in Chapter 2. That 
is, the algorithm is usually defined in the form “first do F(a,b,c,d), then F(d,a,b,c), 
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then F(c,d,a,b), then F(b,c,d,a)…” and so on. In the new notation we use the fact that 
in every step operation only one register is modified. We denote the content of the 
register changed in step i by Ri. If we initialize R-1=b, R-2=c, R-3=d, 
R-4=a, we denote the step operation in step i by 
1 4 1 2 3( ( , , ) )i i i i i i i i iR R R f R R R W T− − − − −= + + + +
« is (3.1.1)
Notice that with the above notation we can solve for Ri-4 and Wi respectively:
4 1( )i i iR R R− −= −
» is −  fi(Ri-1,Ri-2,Ri-3) i iW T− − (3.1.2)
1( )i i iW R R −= −
» is −  fi(Ri-1,Ri-2,Ri-3) – Ti – Ri-4 (3.1.3)
We state the following very important theorem and its corollaries governing the 
relationship between modular differences, xor differences and signed bitwise 
differences mostly without proof.
Theorem 3.1.1 ([2]) Let , ' {0,1}nx x ∈ with some fixed signed bitwise difference 
.x±∆ Then the ⊕ -difference x⊕∆ and the modular difference x+∆ are uniquely 
determined.
Proof.
This is obvious because knowing the signed bitwise difference directly gives you the
values of x and 'x in the bit positions that have non zero differences. So computing the 
xor difference and modular difference for these bit positions is trivial. For bit 
positions with a signed bitwise difference of zero, the xor difference and modular 
difference is zero because x and 'x  have the same values in these bit positions.
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l j n k x for k i k j
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= ≤ ≤ − = ≤ ≤ + −
Then it holds
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0 0 0
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1 1 1
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x k l k l k if k l n
x
or x n k else
x k l k l k if k l nx







 ∆ = + + − + < ∆ = ⇔  
∆ = −  
 ∆ = + + − + < ∆ = − ⇔  
∆ = −  
The theorem shows that when transforming a modular difference into an 
⊕ -difference, a modular difference of 2k can affect more than just the kth bit of the 
⊕ -difference or signed bitwise difference depending on the input bits. That is, for a 
given modular difference, there can be many XOR differences. For example, when 
the modular difference 6' 2x x− = for some value x, then we have the following 
possibilities for the XOR difference:
• One bit difference in bit 6, i.e., 0 00000040x x⊕∆ = . This means that bit 6 in x
is a 1 and bit 6 in 'x  is 0.
• Two bit difference where a carry is transferred from bit 6 to bit 7, i.e., 
0 000000 0x x c⊕∆ = . This means that 6 70, 1x x= = and 
' '
6 71, 0x x= = .
• Three bit difference where a carry is transferred from bit 6 to bit 7 and then to 
bit 8, i.e., 0 000001 0x x c⊕∆ = . This means that 6 7 80, 0, 1x x x= = =  and 
' ' '
6 7 81, 1, 0x x x= = = .
• In general, there can be more carries propagating to further bits and the bit 
pattern is x = 1000… and 'x  = 0111…
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In case the modular difference is -26, the XOR difference remains unchanged but 
the values of x and 'x are exchanged.
Corollary 3.1.3 ([2]) 2 2 0 : [ ,..., ]k kx or x l x k l k+ + ⊕∆ = ∆ = − ⇒ ∃ ≥ ∆ = + .
The next corollary corrects the incorrect probabilities stated in [2].




Pr( [ , 1,..., ]) 2 ,
Pr( [ 1,..., ]) 2 .
l
n k




∆ = + + − =
∆ = − =
For fixed 2kx+∆ = − the following probabilities hold:
( 1)
( )
Pr( [ , 1,..., ]) 2 ,
Pr( [ 1,..., ]) 2 .
l
n k




∆ = + + − =
∆ = − =
Thus in both cases we have
( 1)
( )
Pr( [ ,..., ]) 2 ,
Pr( [ 1,..., ]) 2
l
n k




∆ = + =
∆ = − =
Proof.
For 2 ,kx+∆ =
( 1)
1Pr( [ , 1,..., ]) Pr( 1, ... 0) 2
l
k l k l kx k l k l k x x x
± − +
+ + −∆ = + + − = = = = = =  and
( )
1Pr( [ 1,..., ]) Pr( ... 0) 2
n k
n kx n k x x
± − −
−∆ = − = = = = =
For 2 ,kx+∆ = −
( )
1Pr( [ , 1,..., ]) Pr( 0, ... 1) 2
l l
k l k l kx k l k l k x x x
± − +
+ + −∆ = + + − = = = = = =  and
( )
1Pr( [ 1,..., ]) Pr( ... 1) 2 .
n k
n kx n k x x
± − −
−∆ = − = = = = =
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We can also consider more complicated modular differences like
0 1
0 12 2 , .
m mx m m+∆ = − > Here the signed bitwise difference is of the form
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1[ , 1,..., , , 1,..., ]x m l m l m m l m l m
±∆ = + + − + + −
as long as 0 1 1,m m l> + where 
( ) , 0,1,iki il l i= = are defined as in Theorem 3.1.2. As a 
concrete example, consider the modular difference 6 23 271 2 2 2x+∆ = − − + − with a 
corresponding signed bitwise difference of the form
[0,1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, 23, 24, 25,26, 27,28, 29,30,31]x±∆ = .
3.2 Modular Addition and Bit Rotation
We start by defining the following notation
[ | ]l i rA A A=
which means that for 1 0( ,..., )nA a a−=  we have 1( ,..., )l n iA a a−= and 1 0( ,..., ).r iA a a−=





if x is true
x
if x is false
 
 =  
 
 
We assume that 0 < k < n and A and B are two integers such that 0 ≤ A,B <  2n and
[ | ]l n k rA A A−= and [ | ]l n k rB B B−= .
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Using this notation we can now state some important lemmas and theorems:
Lemma 3.2.1 ([2])
A«k [ | ],r k lA A=
[ | ],l l r n k r rA B A B c A B
+
−+ = + + +
[ | ],l l r n k r rA B A B c A B
−
















are the carry bits coming from the right half of the computation.
With the knowledge of Lemma 3.2.1 we can deduce the following theorems 
which describe the error that occurs when we modify equations by reversing the order 
of addition and bit rotation:
Theorem 3.2.2 ([2])


















are the carry bits from the full and right side additions respectively.
Theorem 3.2.3 ([2])














are the carry bits coming from the full and right side subtractions respectively.
Theorem 3.2.4 ([2]) Let Pα,β (with , {0,1}α β ∈ ) be the probability that 
(A+B)«k – (A«k+B«k) = [ | ].kα β−
1. If we suppose A to be fixed and B to be chosen uniformly at random, then
0,0 2 (2 )(2 )
n n k k
r lP A A
− −= − −
2. If we suppose A and B to be chosen independently and uniformly at random, then
( )
0,0 (1 2 2 2 ) / 4
n k k nP − − − −= + + +
Theorem 3.2.5 ([2]) Let Pα,β (with , {0,1}α β ∈ ) be the probability that 
(A− B)«k – (A«k− B«k) = 2 .kα β−
1. If we suppose A to be fixed and B to be chosen uniformly at random, then
0,0 2 ( 1)( 1)
n
r lP A A
−= + +
2. If we suppose A to be chosen uniformly at random and B to be fixed, then
0,0 2 (2 )(2 )
n k n k
l rP B B
− −= − −
3. If we suppose A and B to be chosen independently and uniformly at random, then
( )
0,0 (1 2 2 2 ) / 4
n k k nP − − − −= + + +
The most important lesson to extract from the last two theorems is that if A and B are 
chosen uniformly at random then the most probable difference is zero. For example, 
we will often find it simpler to replace (A«k-B«k) with (A-B)«k. Why? Because if A 
and B are chosen uniformly at random then the probability that the difference 
between the quantities (A«k-B«k) and (A-B)«k is zero is given by case 3 of Theorem 
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3.2.5. This also turns to be the most likely difference. This is important in our 
cryptanalysis because it enables us to simplify equations.
3.3 Difference Propagation
Before we directly dive into the subject of difference propagation in hash functions, it 
is worthwhile to mention a few sentences on the measurement of avalanche effect in 
hash functions. Because the ideal of a cryptographic hash function is to behave like a 
random function, a hash function is designed so that it has a strong avalanche effect. 
This means that an average of one half of the output bits should change whenever a 
single input bit is complemented. The avalanche factor tries to mathematically 
abstract the desirable property of high nonlinearity between input and output bits, and 
specifies that the hashes of messages from a close neighborhood in the domain are 
dispersed over the whole range. Another property of random functions and thus 
desired of good hash functions is completeness. Completeness is defined as the fact 
that every output bit depends on all the input bits, and not a proper subset of them.
The concept of completeness and the avalanche effect can be combined to define 
what is called the strict avalanche criterion. A cryptographic hash function satisfies 
the strict avalanche criterion when each output bit changes with a probability of 
1
2
whenever a single input bit is complemented. There are ways to measure the 
strength of the avalanche factor of hash functions. Though MD5 demonstrates good 
avalanche effect, it can be empirically shown that it behaves far from a random 
function ([2]).
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Recall that in section 3.1 we introduced a notation to express step operations. 
That is we denoted the content of the register changed after step operation i by Ri and 
the formula for a step operation was given by equation 3.1.1. We also showed that the 
step operations can be reversed (cf. equation 3.1.2, 3.1.3), i.e. we can go backwards 
through all the steps by computing 4iR − from 3 2 1, ,i i iR R R− − − , and Ri. Typically, the 
focus of the attacks on the collision resistance property of hash functions is on the 
difference between register values generated by the different messages rather than on 
the actual register values themselves. In other words, consider two different messages 
resulting in input words Wi and 'iW in the i
th step operation. Denote the computed 
register values by Ri and 'iR  respectively. Then we are generally interested in 
iR
+∆ and how this difference propagates in the computation of successive step 
operations. It turns out that in Wang’s collision finding scheme this difference has a 
structural pattern which can be exploited to break MD5.
It can be shown that MD5 has a much stronger avalanche effect in the forward 
direction than in the reverse direction ([2]). Although we are merely speculating, it 
seems intuitive that this effect can be exploited, when looking for a differential
pattern, because it is much easier to control small differences when computing 
backwards than forwards. The notion of a differential pattern will be properly
explained in the next chapter. However, for now it will suffice to know that a 
differential pattern provides some sort of structure to the output differential of each 
step operation by explicitly stating what that modular and xor differential must be 
after each step operation. The attack will then succeed with a high probability if we 
can find two different messages whose output differential (modular and xor) after 
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each step operation matches the differential pattern. No one really knows how Wang 
computed the differential pattern but we can make some intelligent guesses as to how 
she arrived at the pattern. Thus what follows is purely speculation. In chapter 4 we 
will give another speculative method by which Wang might have computed the 
differential pattern.
Note that in order for a collision to occur we must 
have 60 61 62 63 0R R R R
+ + + +∆ = ∆ = ∆ = ∆ = . Then using equation 3.1.2, we can 
approximately compute:
59 63 62( )R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ − ∆ » 63s 63 62 61 61 63( , , )f R R R W
+ + + +− ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ . 
Roughly speaking, we can continue in this fashion and build a differential pattern
bottom up that needs to be satisfied in order for a collision to occur. Because of the 
weak avalanche effect of MD5 in the reverse direction, we may approximately 
compute the differential pattern in the reverse direction as well.
To be more concrete, we start by fixing some modular differences 
3,...,i iR R
+ +
−∆ ∆ for register values and iW
+∆  for input word value after step i. Strictly 
speaking, using equation 3.1.2 to compute iR
+∆ as above isn’t mathematically correct. 
However, Corollary 3.1.4 and Theorem 3.2.5 will tell us with what probability using 
such a reformulation is correct. It turns out that this probability is sufficiently high. 
For example, if we have a fixed difference 2tR+∆ = for registers R and 'R , and let s
denote the number of bits to rotate by, then by the notation used in section 3.2 we 
have,
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and using Theorem 3.2.5, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3.1 ([2]) Let 0 < s < n and 2tR+∆ = with 0 ,t n≤ < and denote 
'( ) .s s sR R R+∆ = −= = = Then for R chosen uniformly at random
Pr( ( ) 2 ) 1 2 , ,
Pr( ( ) 2 ) 1 2 , .
s t s t s n
s t s n t n
R if t n s
R if t n s
+ + + −
+ + − −
∆ = = − < −
∆ = = − ≥ −
=
=
Thus as long as ( )n t−  or ( )n s t− −  is not too small, rotating the difference is a good 
approximation to the difference of the rotated values. This is the reason that we can 
replace 1(( )i iR R
+
−∆ −
» is ) with 1( )i iR R
+ +
−∆ − ∆
» is in the reformulation to 
compute iR
+∆ .
Analyzing the differential resulting from the boolean functions is a little more 
complicated. When a modular difference 0iR
+∆ ≠ is used in the boolean function, we 
need to make assumptions about the signed bitwise difference .iR
±∆ By Corollary 
3.1.4, for a modular difference of 2k or 2k− , the most likely (with probability 1
2
) 
signed bitwise difference is [ ]k or [ ]k respectively. We will use this fact and 
information from Table 3.1 in the following example to illustrate how the differential 
pattern is computed.
Example 3.3.1
Suppose we want to have a collision appearing in step 25 of the compression 
function of MD5. This means that we must have
24
25 22... 0.R R
+ +∆ = = ∆ =
We proceed by computing the differential pattern backwards as follows:
Step 25:
21 25 24( )R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ − ∆ »9 25 24 23 22 25( , , )f R R R W
+ + + +− ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ . 
Given that 25 22... 0R R
+ +∆ = = ∆ = , we have 21 25.R W
+ +∆ = −∆
Here we can introduce an input difference, say, 925 2W
+∆ = and thus we have 
established 921 2R
+∆ = − as part of the differential pattern.
Step 24:
20 24 23( )R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ − ∆ »5 24 23 22 21 24( , , )f R R R W
+ + + +− ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ . 
Because 24 23 0R R
+ +∆ = ∆ = , we only need to concern ourselves with 921 2R
+∆ = − in 
the boolean function. First of all, we need to make an assumption on the signed 
bitwise difference 21.R
±∆ As stated earlier, by Corollary 3.1.5, 921 [9] 2R
±∆ = = − with 
probability 1 .
2
Since 24 zxyf ITE= , from Table 3.1, we see that the 9
th bit of 24 :f
24 23 22 21( , , )f R R R
+ + +∆ ∆ ∆ 23 22 21( , , ) (0,0, 1) 1.zxy zxyITE R R R ITE x
+ + += ∆ ∆ ∆ = − = −
Because this depends on the actual value of x, the 9th bit of f24 is zero with probability 
1 .
2
 Now, choosing not to introduce an input difference in 24W
+∆ , we see that with 
probability 1
2
 we have 20 0R
+∆ = . 
Why do we choose not to introduce an input difference in 24W
+∆ ? Because 
minimal input differences causes minimal output differences. Since our goal is 
maximize our chance of finding different inputs that map to the same output, we only 
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introduce an input difference when necessary. The inspiration for this idea comes 
from Hans Dobbertin’s attack on the compression function of MD5 [8].
Step 23:
19 23 22( )R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ − ∆ »20 23 22 21 20 23( , , )f R R R W
+ + + +− ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ . 
Again, 921 2R
+∆ = − appears in the boolean function. Since 23 zxyf ITE= , from Table 
3.1, we see that the 9th bit of 23 :f
23 22 21 20( , , )f R R R
+ + +∆ ∆ ∆ 22 21 20( , , ) (0, 1,0) .zxy zxyITE R R R ITE x
+ + += ∆ ∆ ∆ = − = −
Because this depends on the actual value of x, the 9th bit of f23 is zero with probability 
1 .
2
 Now, choosing not to introduce an input difference in 23W
+∆ , we see that with 
probability 1
2
 we have 19 0R
+∆ = . 
Step 22:
18 22 21( )R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ − ∆ »14 22 21 20 19 22( , , )f R R R W
+ + + +− ∆ ∆ ∆ − ∆ .
Since 21R
+∆ 92= −  appears in the rotation part of the equation, we use Corollary 3.3.1 
with t = 9, s = 14, n = 32, to deduce that 
14
22 21( )R R
+ +∆ − ∆ ? = 9 14 9 14 27(0 ( 2 )) (2 ) 2− − = =? ? with probability 91 2−− .
As in step 23, we see that the 9th bit of f22 is zero with probability
1
2
. We again 
do not introduce an input difference for 22W
+∆ and we have 2718 2R
+∆ = as part of the 
differential pattern.
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We can continue in this fashion and determine differential characteristics for all 64 
steps. This concludes our treatment of difference propagation and consequently our 
presentation of the background knowledge necessary to understand Wang’s attack.
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Table 3.1: Propagation of signed bitwise differences.
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Chapter 4: Wang’s Attack on MD4
In this chapter we will discuss Wang’s attack on MD5 in detail. First we present a 
high level view of the attack by giving the general algorithm and further dissect the 
algorithm in the following sections.
The objective of the attack is to find two colliding 1024-bit messages. Let 





(0,0,0,0, 2 ,0,0,0,0,0,0, 2 ,0,0, 2 ,0)





and let ' ' '0 1( , )M M M= be another 1024-bit message such that 
'
0 0 0M M δ= + and 
'
1 1 1M M δ= + . If M and 
'M are colliding messages then MD5 (M ) = MD5 ( 'M ).
Note that the message block differential index starts at 0 and 0th word differential 
starts at the left. For example, for 0δ the fourth word differential is 
312  and the 
eleventh word differential is 152 .
Let 'i i iR R R
+∆ = − . From the previous chapter, we know that iR
+∆ and 
iR
⊕∆ represent the modular difference and xor difference respectively of the output 
after the ith step operation. In Wang’s attack these differences must attain certain pre-
specified values after each step operation called a differential characteristic (cf. Table 
4.1 below). For example, in the case of modular differences, 
3 0R
+∆ = whereas 64 2R
+∆ = . Recall from section 3.1 that as a consequence of 
Theorem 3.1.3, a particular modular differential does not determine a unique xor 
differential. In addition, given a nonzero xor differential alone for the ith step 
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operation, we cannot determine the exact bit values for 'iR and iR . In Wang’s method, 
xor differences after each step operation are implicitly given by specifying values of 
certain bits of iR and 
'
iR . To show this, we need another notation. All bit positions are 
indexed from 0:
'
1 2 3 4 5[ , , , , ]X X i i i i i= − − denotes that 
1 4 5
0i i iX X X= = =  and 2 3 1i iX X= =  whereas,
1 4 5
' ' ' 1i i iX X X= = = and 2 3
' ' 0i iX X= =  and,
'
i iX X=  for all 1 2 3 4 5( , , , , ).i i i i i i∉
For example, in the 4th step operation, '4 4[6,..., 21, 22]R R= − , which means that for 
4R bit 6 ( ,6iR ) to bit 21 ( ,21iR ) are set to 0, and bit 22 ( ,22iR ) is set to 1, whereas for 
'
4R bit 6 to bit 21 are set to 1, and bit 22 is set to 0. All other bits are the same for 
4R and
'
4R . Thus we know both the xor difference and modular difference of 4R and 
'
4R . The collection of these differential characteristics is collectively called the 
differential pattern. Since we are processing 1024-bit messages each consisting of 
two 512-bit blocks, the differential pattern is composed of 128 differential 
characteristics; 64 for the first block and 64 for the second block. Table 4.1 gives the 
differential characteristics for the first block. These tables were copied from [1] with 
modifications to reflect our notation. The first column denotes the step operation 
number, the second column denotes the output value of the step operation, the third 
column denotes the message word for 0M in each step, the fourth column denotes the 
shift rotation, the fifth column denotes the modular difference in the message word, 
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the sixth column denotes the modular difference in the step operation output, and the 
seventh column denotes the step operation output for '0M . The empty items and the 
unlisted steps have zero differences in the fifth and sixth columns. 
The idea of the attack is to find two messages such that their step operation 
differentials match the differential pattern laid out by Wang, which consequently 
results in a collision. Furthermore, Wang computes what are called necessary 
conditions for the differential characteristics to hold with improved probability. These 
necessary conditions dictate the actual values in certain bit positions of the output of a 
step operation. For example, to ensure that the differential characteristics in step i are 
satisfied with high probability, the necessary conditions will require that certain bit 
values of 4 ,...,i iR R− are set to 1 and certain other bits are set to 0. For example, the 
necessary conditions for the differential characteristics to hold in step 16 
are 16,3 15,3 16,17 15,15 16,17 16,31, , 0, 0R R R R R R= = = = . As a matter of fact, the seventh 
column of Table 4.1 also gives some of the necessary conditions because they 
explicitly provide the bit values of the step operation output. Obviously given a 
randomly chosen 1024-bit message M and a second message 'M computed as above, 
it is more likely that the all the differential characteristics are not satisfied and thus 
yields no collision. However, Wang uses message modification techniques to ensure 
that the necessary conditions are met, which in turn ensures that the differential 
characteristics are satisfied with high probability. Given this the algorithm for finding 
a collision in MD5 proceeds as follows:
1. Repeat the following steps until all first block differential characteristics are 
satisfied:
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(i) Select a random 512-bit block 0M .
(ii) Use message modification techniques on 0M to ensure that most of 
the necessary conditions for the first block differential pattern are 
met.
(iii) Let '0 0 0M M δ= +  and apply the compression function to check 
that the step operation differentials satisfy the differential 
characteristics for the first block as laid out in Table 4.1. 
2. Repeat the following steps until a collision is found:
(i) Select a random 512-bit block 1M .
(ii) Use message modification techniques on 1M to ensure that most of
the necessary conditions for the second block differential pattern 
are met.
(iii) Let '1 1 1M M δ= +  and apply the compression function (with the 
state variables determined from the output of the first block) to 
check if there is a collision.
Notice that we insist that the message modification techniques result in 
satisfying only most of the necessary conditions. It is natural to ask: why not require 
that the message modification techniques result in satisfying all the necessary 
conditions? The answer is that it is computationally inefficient to satisfy all 
conditions because there aren’t fast message modification algorithms to do so. 
Instead, it is computationally more efficient to run the algorithm probabilistically by 
using clever message modification techniques to satisfy as many conditions as 
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possible. There are also many other questions to be answered here. Given the 
differential pattern, how are the necessary conditions determined? How are the initial 
message block differentials 0δ and 1δ chosen? How is the differential pattern chosen? 
What are message modification techniques? All these questions will be answered in 
the following sections with concrete examples.
Step The output 




+∆ The output in the ith
Step for '0M
3 3R 3m 22
4 4R 4m 7 312− 62 4[6,..., 21, 22]R −
5 5R 5m 12 6 23 312 2 2− − 5[ 6, 23,31]R −
6 6R 6m 17 6 23 271 2 2 2+ − + 6[6,7,8,9,10, 11, 23, 24, 25,
26,27, 28,29,30,31,0,1, 2,3,4, 5]
R − − − −
−
7 7R 7m 22 15 17 231 2 2 2− + + + 7[0,15, 16,17,18,19, 20, 23]R − − −
8 8R 8m 7 6 311 2 2− + − 8[ 0,1,6,7, 8, 31]R − − −
9 9R 9m 12 12 312 2− − 9[ 12,13,31]R −
10 10R 10m 17 30 312 2− − 10[30,31]R
11 11R 11m 22 152− 7 13 312 2 2+ − 11[7, 8,13,...,18, 19,31]R − −
12 12R 12m 7 24 312 2− − 12[ 24,25,31]R −
13 13R 13m 12 312− 13[31]R
14 14R 14m 17 312− 3 15 312 2 2− + − 14[3, 15,31]R −
15 15R 15m 22 29 312 2− 15[ 29,31]R −
16 16R 1m 5 312− 16[31]R
17 17R 6m 9 312− 17[31]R
18 18R 11m 14 152− 17 312 2− − 18[17,31]R
19 19R 0m 20 312− 19[31]R
20 20R 5m 5 312− 20[31]R
21 21R 10m 9 312− 21[31]R
32
22 22R 15m 14 22R
23 23R 4m 20 312− 23R
24 24R 9m 5 24R
25 25R 14m 9 312− 25R
26 26R 3m 14 26R
… … … … … … …
33 33R 8m 11 33R
34 34R 11m 16 152− 312− 34[31]R
35 35R 14m 23 312− 312− 35[31]R
36 36R 1m 4 312− 36[31]R
37 37R 4m 11 312− 312− 37[31]R
38 38R 7m 16 312− 38[31]R
… … … .. … … …
44 44R 9m 4 312− 44[31]R
45 45R 12m 11 312− 45[31]R
46 46R 15m 16 312− 46[31]R
47 47R 2m 23 312− 47[31]R
48 48R 0m 6 312− 48[31]R
49 49R 7m 10 312− 49[ 31]R −
50 50R 14m 15 312− 312− 50[31]R
51 51R 5m 21 312− 51[ 31]R −
… …. … … … … …
57 57R 15m 10 312− 57[ 31]R −
58 58R 6m 15 312− 58[31]R
59 59R 13m 21 312− 59[31]R
60 60 60 4R R R−= + 4m 6 312− 312− 60[31]R
61 61 61 3R R R−= + 11m 10 152− 312− 61[25,31]R
62 62 62 2R R R−= + 2m 15 312− 62[ 25, 26,31]R −
63 63 63 1R R R−= + 9m 21 312− 63[25, 31]R −
Table 4.1. The differential characteristics for the first block
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4.1 Computing Necessary Conditions for the Differential Characteristics
The best way to explain this is to do an example. The following example is from [3].
Let us determine the necessary conditions for the differential characteristic in step 4
for the first message block (cf. Table 4.1). Typically the step operation of the ith step 
is given by equation 3.1.1. We can rewrite the step operation as follows:
1 2 3 4
1
( , , )
( )i
i i i i i i i i
s
i i i
Q f R R R R W T
R R Q
− − − −
−
= + + +
= + =
We can reformulate the modular differential: '1 (( ) ( ) )i i
s s
i i i iR R Q Q
+ +
−∆ = ∆ + −
= =
by using Corollary 3.2.5 to produce:
1 (( ) )i
s
i i iR R Q
+ + +
−∆ = ∆ + ∆
= , where
1 2 3 4( , , )i i i i i i iQ f R R R R W
+ + + +
− − − −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ (4.1.1)
Though it is not indicated in Tables 4.1, if
+∆ is an important intermediate step in 
computing iR
+∆ . However Hawkes et al. [3], provide this information and we will use 
it to compute the necessary conditions. It isn’t hard to arrive at the values for if
+∆ , 
given that we have equation 4.1.1. In our example, in order to have 
6 23 31
5 2 2 2R
+∆ = − −  given that we also have 64 2R
+∆ =  and 5 12s = , it is easy to see 
that 19 115 2 2 ,Q
+∆ = − − which implies that 19 115 2 2f
+∆ = − − because 1 5 0R W
+ +∆ = ∆ = . 
We are given 62 3 40, 0, 2R R R
+ + +∆ = ∆ = ∆ = , and we want 19 115 2 2 .f
+∆ = − −
• Obtaining the correct 4R
⊕∆ :
Because 2 3 0R R
+ +∆ = ∆ = , the only way to obtain 19 115 2 2f
+∆ = − −  is to have 
4R




+∆ = is the only non zero differential we have to work with in 5f . This 
means that we have 4, 0kR = for 6 19k≤ ≤ and 4,20 1R = (cf. Theorem 3.1.2). 
Wang’s attack dictates that 4, 0kR = for 6 21k≤ ≤ and 4,22 1R = , although 
4, 0kR = for 6 19k≤ ≤ and 4,20 1R =  is more probable. However, we shall be 
satisfied with Wang’s conditions. Thus so far we have the conditions:
4,6 4,7 4,21... 0R R R= = = = and 4,22 1.R =
• Obtaining the correct 5f
+∆ :
We want to figure out the fewest conditions necessary to obtain 19 115 2 2f
+∆ = − − . 
To do this we make use of what we obtained previously. Specifically, we have 
4,11 4,19 1R R
± ±∆ = ∆ = −  (Note the use of signed bitwise difference). Thus, somehow 
we need to arrive at 5,11 5,19 1f f
± ±∆ = ∆ = − .
We have two cases to consider:
(i) Zero value bits of 4R
⊕∆ :
For this case we consider 4, 0kR
⊕∆ = for 0 5k≤ ≤  and 23 31k≤ ≤ . The 
Boolean function is 5 4 3 2 4 3 4 2( , , ) ( ) ( )f R R R R R R R= ∧ ∨ ¬ ∧ . Observe that this 
function evaluates according to the following rule:
If ( 4, 1kR = ) then “output 3,kR ” else “output 2,kR ”.
That is why this function is called the “If then Else” function and 
consequently abbreviated as ITE. Thus we have,
−Select 5, 3,k kf R= and 
' '
5, 3,k kf R= when
'
4, 4, 1k kR R= = , or
−Select 5, 2,k kf R= and 
' '
5, 2,k kf R= when
'
4, 4, 0k kR R= = .
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Since 2 3 0R R
+ +∆ = ∆ =  and consequently 2 3 0R R
⊕ ⊕∆ = ∆ = , we see that 
5 5 0f f
+ ⊕∆ = ∆ =  for these bits and no conditions are required.
(ii) Nonzero value bits of 4R
⊕∆ :
For 6 21,k≤ ≤
We have 4, 0kR = and
'
4, 1kR = , which implies that 
5, 2,k kf R= and
' '
5, 3,k kf R= .
For 21, 20,12 18,6 10,k k k k= = ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ we require that '5, 5,k kf f= , 
which implies that '2, 3, 3,k k kR R R= = .
For 19k = and 11k = , we want 5, 1kf
±∆ = − which implies 
that '3, 2, 3, 2, 1k k k kR R R R− = − = . Here the minus sign represents signed 
bitwise subtraction. This results in 3, 1kR = and 2, 0kR = .
For 22,k =
We have 4, 1kR = and
'
4, 0kR = , which implies that 
5, 3,k kf R= and
' '
5, 2,k kf R= .
Thus the conditions obtained for the 4th step operation are:
4, 0kR =  for 6 21,k≤ ≤
4, 1kR =  for 22,k =
3, 1kR =  for 11k = and 19,k =
2, 0kR = for 11k = and 19,k =
3, 2,k kR R=  for 6 10,12 18, 20, 21k k k k≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ = = .
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4.2 The Message Block Differentials and Differential Pattern
The calculation of the differential pattern and message block differentials are the 
heart of Wang’s attack on MD5, and not coincidentally the differential pattern and 
message block differentials are shrouded in mystery. However, we can make 
intelligent conjectures as to how the differential pattern was computed, and how the 
message block differentials were chosen. Recall that in section 3.3, we speculated on 
how to compute the differential pattern by taking advantage of the weak avalanche 
factor of MD5 in the reverse direction. In this section we present yet another idea on 
how to compute the differential pattern. We also present an idea that could potentially 
explain how the message block differentials are chosen. Both the ideas and the 
illustrated example are due to [4]. Before we delve into the illustration, a remark is in 
order. Wang states that the message block differentials are picked so that the 
differential pattern in round 3 and round 4 of MD5 for each message block are 
satisfied with high probability. Given what we know now about difference 
propagation, this claim should not seem unreasonable. The differential pattern in 
Wang’s attack is there to ensure that a collision will take place. So by the time the 
step output differentials have arrived at round 3, further propagation of these step 
output and message block differentials had better satisfy the differential 
characteristics in round 3 and round 4 if we are to have a good chance at arriving at a 
collision. Roughly speaking then we would expect to work backwards to arrive at a 
differential pattern for round 1 and round 2 similar to example 3.3.1.
Because Wang states that the message block differentials are picked so that 
the third and fourth round differential characteristics are satisfied with high 
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probability, we will start by analyzing the differential pattern in these rounds. We 
begin by making the following important observations which apply to both the first 
and second blocks:
• For the step operations in round 3 and round 4 that have nonzero modular 
difference, these modular differences are exactly 31 312 2− = (cf. Table 4.1). 
• The modular difference in the last few steps of round 2 and the first few steps 
of round 3 is zero (cf. Table 4.1). 
• The Boolean function used in round 3 is if XOR= for32 47i≤ ≤ . This is 
important because if  is a linear function, i.e.
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )i i if x u y v z w f x y z f u v w⊕ ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕ . Observe that any change in a 
particular bit position of any one of the three input words necessarily results in 
a change of the output in that same bit position.
Let us just consider the differential pattern for the first block. So how is the 
modular difference of 312  propagated through round 3 and round 4? To answer this 
we make use of the facts that the differential is zero in the last few steps of round 2 
and the first few steps of round 3, and the Boolean function is linear. The first bit 
difference in round 3 is introduced in step 34 due to the message block difference.
Step 34:
We have ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1634 33 30 34 33 32 31 34 34( ( , , ) )R R R f R R R W T= + + + +
= . 
Because the differential in the last few steps of round 2 and round 3 is zero, and 
' ' 15
34 11 11 2W m m= = + , we can write:
' 15 16
34 33 30 33 32 31 11 34( ( , , ) 2 ) .iR R R f R R R m T= + + + + +
=
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From Theorem 3.2.4, we can infer that ' 15 16 3134 34 34(2 ) 2R R R= + = +
= as stated in 
Table 4.1.
Step 35:
Here ' ' 3135 14 14 2W m m= = + . 
So we have ' ' ' 31 2335 34 31 35 34 33 32 14 35( ( , , ) 2 )R R R f R R R m T= + + + + +
= .
Substituting 3134 2R +  for 
'
34R we obtain,
' 31 31 31 23
35 34 31 35 34 33 32 14 352 ( ( 2 , , ) 2 )R R R f R R R m T= + + + + + + +
= . 
Using the linearity property of 35f we get,
' 31 31 31 23
35 34 31 35 34 33 32 14 35
31 23 31
34 31 35 34 33 32 14 35 35
2 ( ( , , ) 2 2 )
2 ( ( , , ) ) 2 .
R R R f R R R m T
R R f R R R m T R
= + + + + + + +




Here no difference is introduced by the message word. Thus making substitutions and 
using the linearity property of the Boolean function, we get:
' ' ' ' 4
36 35 32 36 35 34 33 36 36( ( , , ) )R R R f R R R W T= + + + +
=
31 31 31 4
35 32 36 35 34 33 36 362 ( ( 2 , 2 , ) )R R f R R R W T= + + + + + + +
=
31 31 31 4
35 32 36 35 34 33 36 362 ( ( , , ) (2 2 ) )R R f R R R W T= + + + + + + +
=
31 4 31
35 32 36 35 34 33 36 36 362 ( ( , , ) ) 2 .R R f R R R W T R= + + + + + = +
=
Step 37:
Here a message word difference is introduced. That is, ' ' 3137 4 4 2 .W m m= = +
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' ' ' ' ' 31 11
37 36 33 37 36 35 34 4 37
31 31 31 31 31 11
36 33 37 36 35 34 4 37
31 31 31 31 31 11
36 33 37 36 35 34 4 37
31
36 33 37 36 35 34 4
( ( , , ) 2 )
2 ( ( 2 , 2 , 2 ) 2 )
2 ( ( , , ) (2 2 2 ) 2 )
2 ( ( , , )
R R R f R R R m T
R R f R R R m T
R R f R R R m T
R R f R R R m T
= + + + + +
= + + + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + + + +





37 37) 2 .R= +
=
Since no message block differentials are used for the rest of the steps in round 3, it is 
easy to see how this differential of 312  propagates down to these steps. How this 
differential propagates through round 4 is not well known. However, we can make an 
educated guess about how this phenomenon might occur. Let us look at Table 4.2
which is due to [4]. This table tells how changes in the input of the Boolean function 
used in the fourth round affect the output of the function. Here we can see cases 
where changes in the input do not change the output value and this phenomenon is 
not uncommon. For example, for ( , , )ONX x y z where 0, 1, 0x y z= = = , we can see 
that flipping x does not change the output. Thus it seems possible that this absorbing 
quality of ONX contributes to the propagation of the differential.
x y z x F∆ ⇒ ∆ y F∆ ⇒ ∆ z F∆ ⇒ ∆
0 0 0 X X
0 0 1 X X X
0 1 0 X X
0 1 1 X X X
1 0 0 X
1 0 1 X X
1 1 0 X
1 1 1 X X
 Table 4.2. Output differences for F = fi 48≤ i <64
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From our analysis above, it seems that the following algorithm might be used 
to determine the message block differential and the step operation output differential 
pattern:
1. Assume that message block differentials can be introduced such that the step 
operation output differential for the first few steps of round 3 is zero.
2. Let i denote the first step operation in round 3 for which it is decided that the 
step operation output differential should be nonzero. In Wang’s method, this 
was step 34. Since this differential must be 312 , and must also propagate down 
to the successive steps as illustrated in our example above, set 31' 2 isi iW W
−= + , 
' 31
1 1 2i iW W+ += + , 
' 31
3 3 2i iW W+ += + . Then, without introducing any further 
message block differences, the step operation output differential of 312 should 
propagate to the rest of the step operations in round 3. Similar to Example 
3.3.1, we introduce as few input differences as possible to minimize 
complications.
3. Using the message differential chosen in the previous step, find a differential 
pattern in the first and second rounds such that the step operation output 
differential for the last four steps of the second round is zero. To understand 
how this might be possible, let us look at Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 which are 
due to [4]. These tables tell us about the correlation between changes in the 
input and output of the Boolean functions used in the first and second rounds 
respectively. Again for these functions, it is common that changes in the input 
do not translate into changes in the output. Thus it seems plausible that the 
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absorbing quality of these Boolean functions could aid in searching for such a 
differential pattern in the first and second round. 
x y z x F∆ ⇒ ∆ y F∆ ⇒ ∆ z F∆ ⇒ ∆
0 0 0 X
0 0 1 X X
0 1 0 X X
0 1 1 X
1 0 0 X
1 0 1 X X
1 1 0 X X
1 1 1 X
 Table 4.3. Output differences for F = fi 0≤ i <16
x y z x F∆ ⇒ ∆ y F∆ ⇒ ∆ z F∆ ⇒ ∆
0 0 0 X
0 0 1 X
0 1 0 X X
0 1 1 X X
1 0 0 X X
1 0 1 X X
1 1 0 X
1 1 1 X
 Table 4.4. Output differences for F = fi 16≤ i <32
In conclusion we stress, yet again, that the analysis given in this section is pure 
speculation and Wang has yet to publish a thorough exposition of her method of 




In section 4.1 we illustrated how to compute the necessary conditions for the 
differential pattern to hold. It turns out that most of the conditions are for the step 
operations in the first round and this proves to be a very important characteristic of 
the structure of the differential pattern. For example, when processing the first block, 
there are a total of 290 conditions and most of them pertain to the first round of the 
compression function. When we pick a random message for the first block, as 
dictated by the algorithm in the beginning of this chapter, it is more likely that we 
will have to modify it to satisfy the conditions for the first block. By having most of 
the conditions in the first round, modifying the message block does not affect 
previous computations because there are no previous computations. For instance, 
modifying the 32-bit word 1m of the message block to meet the conditions in step 
1(round 1) is easier than having to modify 1m to meet the conditions in step 16 (round 
2). This is because a modification in round 2 affects the step operation differentials 
computed in round 1. Thus we will have to go back to round 1 and make adjustments.
There are two types of message modification techniques. The message 
modification technique used to modify messages to satisfy the necessary conditions 
of the first round is called single message modification. In order to improve the 
probability of satisfying the differential pattern in the second round, messages will 
need to be modified to satisfy the conditions in this round. The message modification 
technique used for the second round is called multi message modification. We will 
now explain both message modification techniques with illustrations that are due to 
[4].
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The idea behind single message modification is quite simple. We simply 
execute the following steps until the differential characteristics of the first round have 
been satisfied:
a. Pick random values for 0 15,...,R R , and flip their bits until all the 
conditions of round 1 are met.
b. Compute the message words using equation 3.1.3. That is, evaluate
1 1 2 3 4( ) ( , , )i
s
i i i i i i i i i im W R R f R R R T R− − − − −= = − − − −
? .
We iterate the fact that these conditions are “necessary” and not “sufficient” as 
incorrectly stated by Wang. Thus satisfying the conditions doesn’t guarantee that the 
differential pattern in round 1 will automatically hold. We might need to run the 
single message modification technique until the first round differential pattern holds. 
The time complexity required to satisfy the differential pattern in the first round is 
much less than the overall collision finding algorithm. Thus we are guaranteed to 
satisfy the differential characteristics of the first round.
The best way to explain the multi message modification technique is through 
examples. We will illustrate a simple example first and then illustrate a slightly more 
complex example to communicate the gist of the technique.
Example 4.3.1
Suppose that in the 16th step operation (first step of round 2), we 
have 16,31 1R = . Then as dictated by the necessary conditions, we will need to correct 
this bit to 16,31 0R = by modifying the message word, 16W , used in the step operation. 
Since 16 1W m= , and 1m is used in the 1
st step operation (second step operation in round 
44
1), modifying 1m could change 1R , which consequently could propagate through out 
the steps in round 1. Then the differential characteristics of round 1 would no longer 
be satisfied. 
We first begin by modifying 1m by adding 
262 to it. That is, 261 1 2
newm m= + . 
This corrects 16,31R by flipping the 1 to 0. How? Observe that the shift amount in the 
16th step is 5. Thus adding 262 to the message word is tantamount to adding 
26 5 31(2 ) 2==  to the step operation output 16R , which results in flipping its most 
significant bit. In order to correct the change to 1R , we recomputed 1R  with the new 
1m as follows:
12
1 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 1( ( , , ) )
new newR R R f R R R m T− − −= + + + +
= .
To ensure none of the other successive step operations in round 1 are modified, we 
recomputed 2 3 4, , ,m m m and 5m to absorb the change to made to 1R . After the 5
th step 
operation 1
newR has been completely absorbed. Thus we have,
17
2 2 1 2 2 1 0 1 2
22
3 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 3
7
4 4 3 0 4 3 2 1 4
12
5 5 4 1 5 4 3 2 5
( ) ( , , )
( ) ( , , )
( ) ( , , )





m R R R f R R R T
m R R R f R R R T
m R R R f R R R T
m R R R f R R R T
− −
−
= − − − −
= − − − −
= − − − −





We have now corrected 16,31R and ensured that the first round differential 
characteristics are satisfied as well. This method of computing new message words 
for successive steps to absorb the effect of 1
newR is due to [7].
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Example 4.3.2
In this example we show how to satisfy the conditions in steps 16, 17, 18 and 19. This 
technique is originally due to [9]. There is a total of 10 conditions:
Step 16:
16,3 15,3 16,16 15,15 16,17 16,31, , 0, 0.R R R R R R= = = =
Step 17:
17,17 17,29 16,29 17,311, , 0.R R R R= = =
Step 18:
18,17 18,310, 0.R R= =
Step 19:
20,31 0.R =
The algorithm to satisfy these 10 conditions as written in [4] is:
1. Choose 2 15,...,R R such that they satisfy the conditions in the first round.
2. For 6 15,i≤ ≤ compute im :
1 1 2 3 4( ) ( , , ) .i
s
i i i i i i i i im R R f R R R R T− − − − −= − − − −
?
3. Pick a random value for 16R with its conditions satisfied, and compute
9
17 16 13 17 16 15 14 17 17
14
18 17 14 18 17 16 15 18 18
( ( , , ) )
( ( , , ) )
R R R f R R R W T
R R R f R R R W T
= + + + +
= + + + +
?
?
until conditions for 17R and 18R are satisfied. Since there is only a total of 9 
conditions for 16 17, ,R R and 18R , it can be done quickly. However it may be the 
case that no value of 16R satisfies the conditions for 17R and 18R because 
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17R and 18R are functions of 13 14, ,R R and 15R as well, which might prove to be 
too inflexible. In this case, we will have to pick new values for 2 15,...,R R and 
start the algorithm all over again. If the conditions for 16 18,...,R R are satisfied 
then proceed to step 4 otherwise go to step 1.
4. Pick a random value for 19R  with its only condition fulfilled, and 
compute 2019 0 19 18 15 19 18 17 16 19( ) ( , , )W m R R R f R R R T= = − − − −
? .
5. Compute 0R from the new value of 0m computed in the previous step.
6. Compute 16 1W m= by rearranging the formula for the 16
th step operation.
7. Compute 1R  from the new value of 1m computed in the previous step.
8. To absorb the new value of 1R , compute 2 5,...,m m :
1 4 1 2 3
2 5,
( ) ( , , )isi i i i i i i i i
for i
m R R R f R R R T− − − − −
≤ ≤
= − − − −?
After computing step 8, 33 conditions in the remaining step operation remain 
unsatisfied. Thus we should expect to pick 332 messages for the first block before all 
the differential characteristics for the first block are met. This means that the time 
complexity of the overall collision finding algorithm can be improved by clever 
algorithms to perform multi message modification techniques and to satisfy more 
second round conditions. Since there isn’t a general method to satisfy second round 
differentials, the algorithms are quite specialized and invented from having clever 
insights into how the differentials propagate. Actually Wang does not perform the 
complex multi message modification as detailed in example 4.3.2 which improves the 
complexity of the collision finding algorithm. Instead she opts for the multi message 
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modification similar to the one in example 4.3.1. Thus she is left with 37 unsatisfied 
conditions for the first block and consequently her time complexity to find the first 
block is 392 MD5 operations. Similarly, 30 conditions are left unsatisfied for the 
second block and her time complexity to find the second block is 322 MD5 operations.
In conclusion, the goal of the message modification techniques is to satisfy as many 
of the conditions as possible in the first and second round. This will then drastically 
increase the probability of satisfying the differential characteristics which 
consequently increases the collision probability. We give a collision found by Wang, 
where H is the hash value:
48
Bibliography
[1] WANG, X., AND YU, H. How to break MD5 and other hash functions, Eurocrypt 
2005, LNCS 3494, pp. 19-35, 2005.
[2] DAUM, M., Cryptanalysis of hash function of the MD4-family, PhD thesis, Ruhr-
University of Bochum, May 2005. http://www.cits.ruhr-uni-
bochum.de/imperia/md/content/magnus/dissmd4.pdf.
[3] HAWKES, P., PADDON, M., AND ROSE, G.G. Musings on the Wang et al. 
MD5 collisions, October 2004. http://iacr.eprint.org/2004/264.
[4] BLACK, J., COCHRAN, M., HIGHLAND, T., A study of the MD5 attacks: 
insights and improvements, FSE 2006.
http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~jrblack/papers/md5e-full.pdf.
[5] STINSON, D., Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Second Edition, pp. 129-130. 
[6] RIVEST, R., The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm, Request for Comments (RFC 
1320), Internet Activities Board, Internet Privacy Task Force, 1992.
[7] CHAUBAUD, F., JOUX, A., Differential Collisions in SHA-0, Crypto 1998, 
LNCS 1462, pp. 56-71, 1998.
[8] DOBBERTIN, H., Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress, Presented at rump session of 
Eurocrypt 1996.
[9] KLIMA, V., Finding MD5 collisions on a notebook using multi-message 
modification technique. In International Scientific Conference Security and 
Protection of Information (May 2005).
